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Abstract: The financing decisions of banks remain an enigma, increasingly attracting the attention of 
banking regulators and corporate finance scholars alike. Hitherto, banks have been excluded from 
extant studies of capital structure principally because it was reasoned that regulation was the overriding 
determinant of bank capital structure. Notwithstanding, there has been increasing empirical work to the 
contrary. This article reports on a study investigating the determinants of bank capital structure. 
Utilising a sample of 16 South African banks for the period 2006–2015, panel data techniques were 
employed and a fixed effects model estimated to test the relationship between bank leverage and the 
firm-level determinants of capital structure (“standard corporate finance view”). It was established that 
the financing behaviour of banks mirrors that of non-financial firms. Growth opportunities, risk and 
size variables were positively related to leverage. The profit and the global financial crisis variables 
were negatively related to leverage. The results therefore confirmed banks deleveraging during the 
2007–2009 global financial crisis. It was also observed that bank financing behaviour conforms to the 
pecking order theory. These findings also lend credence to the “standard corporate finance view” of 
bank capital structure and negate the role of bank capital regulation. At worst, the capital regulations 
are ineffectual and not binding. 
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1. Introduction  
The financial well-being of banking institutions is a necessary condition for the 
attainment of financial stability of any economy. Banks perform the critical role of 
financial intermediation in an economy. Arguably, among other factors, the capital 
structure choices of banks determine their financial well-being. Notwithstanding, 
bank financing decisions are opaque and continue to attract the attention of banking 
regulators and corporate finance scholars alike. The study on which this article 
reports, attempted to disentangle the factors that determine a bank’s capital structure.  
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Capital structure theory is firmly founded upon the seminal works of Modigliani and 
Miller (1958, p. 268). They postulated that in a frictionless efficient markets’ world 
with no taxes or bankruptcy, the value of the firm is invariant to its capital structure. 
Put in other words, what they meant is that the value of the firm is not influenced by 
its financing decision, that is, its selection of debt and equity mix. However, what is 
implausible about their theory is the existence of a ‘frictionless market’. Such a 
market is only an ideal environment and does not exist. Suffice to say that the 
environment that characterises the financial markets is one where the risk of 
bankruptcy is a reality and where firms have to pay corporate taxes. As such, in the 
absence of a “frictionless market”, the capital structure choices might have an 
influence on firm value and Modigliani and Miller’s propositions will no longer hold. 
Modigliani and Miller (1963, p. 438) would later relax the proposition of perfect 
markets to incorporate corporate tax into their models. The rationale for doing so 
was the realisation that debt is tax-deductible and therefore, a firm that utilises debt 
is bound to enjoy an interest tax shield. As such, as increasingly more debt is used, 
the market value of the firm would increase by the present value of the interest tax 
shield. 
In the real-word scenario, their propositions hardly hold and have subsequently been 
challenged by several scholars. It has been demonstrated through empirical studies 
that capital structure does matter. Subsequent departures have proven that such an 
ideal world does not exist and that there are imperfections such as taxes, costs of 
financial distress and especially regulation in the case of financial institutions.1  
Extant studies on capital structure have generally excluded financial firms from their 
analysis. This has been premised on the notion that financial firms have peculiar firm 
characteristics. Against this backdrop, the study reported on in this article sought to 
investigate the determinants of capital structure by specifically focusing on the 
banking sector in the context of South Africa. Previous studies on bank capital 
structure have focused on developed countries. The motivation for selecting South 
Africa as the focus of this study lay in its stage of development and the sophistication 
of its financial sector, notwithstanding that it is a developing country.  
The significance of the study is mainly threefold. Firstly, previous studies that sought 
to test the theories of capital structure and establish the determinants of capital 
structure have nearly exclusively focused on non-financial firms.2 The justification 
for the exclusion of financial firms from studies on capital structure has either been 
that they are regulated entities or as a consequence of their intrinsic firm-level 
characteristics (such as having premiums or deposits as another source of capital). 
                                                             
1 See for instance (Berger, Herring & Szegö, 1995; DeMarzo & Duffie, 1995; Froot & Stein, 1998; 
Miller, 1995; Smith & Stulz, 1985). 
2 See for instance (Fama & French, 1998; Frank & Goyal, 2004; 2009; Graham & Harvey, 2001; 
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Secondly, the status quo has been challenged and it has subsequently been proven, 
starting with Gropp and Heider (2010), that notwithstanding regulation, the 
determinants of capital structure of banking institutions are largely the same as those 
of non-financial firms. The caveat is that their study was based on large US banks. 
As such it is open to conjecture – whether their results could be replicated across the 
financial sector as well across financial firms of different sizes.  
Unlike some recent studies, this study factored into account the spill-over effects of 
bank financing.1 Banking firms are dependent on one another for financing through 
their interactions in the interbank market. As such, previous studies have not 
corrected for cross-sectional dependence, hence the reliability of their results is 
questionable. In this study, tests for cross-sectional dependence were conducted. 
Where cross-sectional dependence was detected, it was corrected for. Furthermore, 
the sample for this study was drawn from the population of all South African banks, 
regardless of size. 
Thirdly, this research effort was conducted in the aftermath of the 2007–2009 global 
financial crisis (GFC). As such, this presented a window of opportunity for the 
investigation of the impact of the GFC on financial firm capital structures. As such, 
this study sought to add to the growing body of literature that has aimed to examine 
the impact of the GFC on firm leveraging.2 
The remainder of article is arranged as follows: the next section reviews the related 
literature. Section 3 outlines the research methodology. Section 4 presents and 
discusses the research findings and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Overview of Literature: Firm-level Determinants of Capital 
Structure 
Frank and Goyal (2009) established that there are “reliably important” firm-level 
factors that have a bearing on firm leveraging. The firm-level factors that usually 
turn up in extant literature and have a demonstrable effect on the capital structure 
choices of firms include, among others, size, asset tangibility, profitability, growth 
opportunities, risk and dividend policy. In this section these firm-level determinants 
are discussed with a view to providing insight into what the major theories of capital 
structure predict about them.  
  
                                                             
1 See for instance (Moyo, 2016). 
2 See for instance (Ariff & Hassan, 2008; Auret, Chipeta & Krishna, 2013; Harrison & Widjaja, 2014; 
Leitner & Stehrer, 2013; Morri & Artegiani, 2015; Zarebski & Dimovski, 2012; Zeitun, Temimi & 
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2.1. Size 
It is expected that as firms grow, they become more profitable and also accumulate 
more tangible assets along their growth trajectory (Sibindi, 2016, p. 228). As a 
consequence, thereof, it would seem as though such firms will have a considerable 
amount of free cash flows. The a priori expectation from a pecking order theory 
perspective is that as firms grow, they generate more profits and hence can make use 
of internally generated resources as opposed to seeking recourse from the debt 
market. As such, large firms are expected to be lowly geared as opposed to small 
firms. Contrary to this prediction by the pecking order theory, the expectation from 
both the trade-off and the market timing models is that large firms should be highly 
leveraged as compared to small firms by reason of the ensuing debt interest tax 
shields they stand to enjoy. Moreover, the dictate of the free cash flow theory is that 
the use of debt will mitigate the agency costs brought about by the abundance of free 
cash flows in large firms. In addition, firm size is arguably an inverse proxy of the 
probability of bankruptcy (Antoniou, Guney & Paudyal, 2008, p. 64; Frank & Goyal, 
2009, p. 8; Rajan & Zingales, 1995, p. 1456). As such, due to lower information 
asymmetry, larger firms are likely to have easier access to debt markets and hence 
are able to borrow at lower cost. 
The empirical evidence to support the positive leverage-firm size nexus prediction 
can be found in the studies by Antoniou et al. (2008, p. 73), Ahmed, Ahmed and 
Ahmed (2010, p. 9), Al-Najjar and Hussainey (2011, p. 334), Lim (2012, p. 197), 
Bartoloni (2013, p. 142) and Lemma and Negash (2014, p. 81), among other 
scholars. To the contrary, Titman and Wessels (1988, p. 6) lend support to the inverse 
leverage-firm size relationship. They contend that the cost of issuing debt and equity 
securities is also related to firm size. In particular, small firms pay much more than 
large firms to issue new equity and also somewhat more to issue long-term debt. This 
suggests that small firms may be more leveraged than large firms and may prefer to 
borrow short-term (through bank loans) rather than issue long-term debt because of 
the lower fixed costs associated with this alternative. 
2.2. Asset Tangibility 
As companies grow, they accumulate more and more tangible assets. Tangible 
assets, such as property, plant and equipment, are easier for outsiders to value than 
intangibles, such as the value of goodwill from an acquisition, and this lowers 
expected distress costs (Frank & Goyal, 2009, p. 9). Further, according to Rajan and 
Zingales (1995, p. 1451), if a large fraction of a firm’s assets is tangible, assets 
should serve as collateral, diminishing the risk of the lender suffering the agency 
costs of debt (such as risk shifting). Assets should also retain more value in 
liquidation. Therefore, the greater the proportion of tangible assets on the balance 
sheet (fixed assets divided by total assets), the more willing lenders should be to 
supply loans, and the higher leverage should be. In addition, tangibility makes it 
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difficult for shareholders to substitute high-risk assets for low-risk ones. The lower 
expected costs of distress and fewer debt-related agency problems predict a positive 
relation between tangibility and leverage. Moreover, these tangible assets can be 
pledged as collateral when borrowing from financial institutions.  
As such, it is expected from a trade-off theory perspective that as companies grow, 
they will borrow more by dint of having more tangible assets to pledge as collateral, 
in order to enjoy the debt interest tax shield. This view is espoused by Antoniou et 
al. (2008, p. 63), who contend that in the case of bankruptcy, tangible assets are more 
likely to have a market value, while intangible assets will lose their value. Therefore, 
the risk of lending to firms with higher tangible assets is lower and, hence, lenders 
will demand a lower risk premium. Therefore, there is presumed to be a positive 
relationship between leverage and asset tangibility. In addition, Harris and Raviv 
(1990, p. 323) contend that firms with higher liquidation value, for example those 
with tangible assets, will have more debt, will have a higher-yield debt and will be 
more likely to default, but will have higher market value than similar firms with 
lower liquidation value, whereas the pecking order theory predicts an inverse 
relationship between firm leverage and asset tangibility. This can be attributed to 
low information asymmetry associated with tangible assets, making equity issuances 
less costly. Therefore, leverage ratios should be lower for firms with higher 
tangibility. (Frank & Goyal, 2009, p. 9) On the one hand, the positive firm leverage-
asset tangibility prediction finds empirical support from Faulkender and Petersen 
(2006, p. 57) and Antoniou et al. (2008, p. 73), among other scholars. On the other 
hand, Bradley, Jarell and Kim (1984, p. 874), Ahmad and Abbas (2011, p. 208) and 
Al-Najjar and Hussainey (2011, p. 333) report an inverse relationship between firm 
leverage and asset tangibility. The dichotomy in the predictions can perhaps be 
explained by the observation that the determination of the capital structure of a firm 
is as a result of the interplay of many factors that are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive. 
2.3. Profitability 
From the pecking order theory vantage point, highly profitable firms are expected to 
employ more and more internal resources to finance the firms at the expense of using 
debt or floating shares. Profitability is associated with the availability of internal 
funds and therefore may be associated with less leverage in terms of the pecking 
order theory (Baker & Wurgler, 2002, p. 7). Therefore, firm leverage is negatively 
associated with profitability.  
Bartoloni (2013) found evidence to lend credence to the inverse firm leverage-
profitability nexus. He found that more profitable firms tend to use internal finance 
more, as implied by the negative relationship linking a firm’s debt ratio and return 
on sales. In addition, he reasons that the role of a firm’s profitability in reducing the 
need for external finance characterises all firms, regardless of size as measured by 
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employment, although large firms show a lower sensitivity of leverage to profit 
variations. This prediction is also supported by the empirical evidence found by 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999, p. 221), Rajan and Zingales (1995, p. 1457), Booth, 
Aivazian, Demirgüç‐Kunt and Maksimovic (2001, p. 117), Hovakimian, Opler and 
Titman (2001, p. 3), Faulkender and Petersen (2006, p. 57), Utrero-González (2007, 
p. 22), Antoniou et al. (2008, p. 67), Frank and Goyal (2009, p. 26), Ahmed et al. 
(2010, p. 10), Ahmad and Abbas (2011, p. 209), Al-Najjar and Hussainey (2011, p. 
334) and Lemma and Negash (2014, p. 81), among other scholars. 
Contrarily, the trade-off theory predicts a positive relationship between firm leverage 
and profitability. From the trade-off vantage point, highly profitable firms are 
expected to make use of more and more debt in order to benefit from the debt interest 
tax shield and maximise the value of the firm. According to Hovakimian, 
Hovakimian and Tehranian (2004, p. 523), the positive firm leverage-profitability 
association may arise for a number of reasons. For example, other things being equal, 
higher profitability implies potentially higher tax savings from debt, lower 
probability of bankruptcy and potentially higher overinvestment, all of which imply 
a higher target debt ratio.  
2.4. Growth 
Frank and Goyal (2009, p. 8) contend that growth increases the costs of financial 
distress, reduces free cash flow problems and exacerbates debt-related agency 
problems. Growing firms place a greater value on stakeholder co-investment. 
Therefore, the trade-off theory predicts that growth reduces leverage. Antoniou et al. 
(2008, p. 62) posit that a negative relation is expected between growth opportunities 
and leverage for two main reasons. Firstly, according to the trade-off theory, the cost 
of financial distress increases with expected growth, forcing managers to reduce the 
debt in their capital structure. Secondly, in the presence of information asymmetries, 
firms issue equity instead of debt when overvaluation leads to higher expected 
growth. Antoniou et al. (2008) further observed, however, that internal resources of 
growing firms may not be sufficient to finance their positive net present value 
investment opportunities and, hence, they may have to raise external capital. In 
essence, if firms require external finance, they issue debt before equity according to 
the pecking order theory. Therefore, growth opportunities and leverage are positively 
related in terms of the pecking order theory.  
Empirical support in favour of the negative firm leverage-growth prediction is found 
in the studies by Rajan and Zingales (1995, p. 1455), Hovakimian et al. (2001, p. 
22), Barclay and Smith (2005, p. 13) and Antoniou et al. (2008, p. 86), among other 
studies. However, empirical support for the positive firm leverage-growth prediction 
is found in the studies by Ahmed et al. (2010, p. 10), Ahmad and Abbas (2011, p. 
208) and Al-Najjar and Hussainey. (2011, p. 333) 
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2.5. Risk 
In finance parlance, risk is defined as the probability of a loss occurring, resulting in 
the impairment of earnings. In the context of firm financing, risk measures the 
volatility of the cash flows or earning prospects of a firm. The trade-off theory 
predicts a negative relationship between firm leverage and risk. In other words, a 
firm that has highly volatile cash flows must avoid debt financing. The intuition 
behind this is that highly volatile cash flows could result in financial distress. As 
such, to avoid going bankrupt, firms with high levels of volatile cash flows must 
desist from debt financing. 
According to Antoniou et al. (2008, p. 64), firms with high earnings volatility carry 
a risk of the earnings level dropping below their debt-servicing commitments. Such 
an eventuality may result in rearranging the funds at a high cost or facing the risk of 
bankruptcy. Therefore, firms with highly volatile earnings should have lower debt 
capital. This view is bolstered by Frank and Goyal (2009, p. 9). They postulate that 
firms with more volatile cash flows face higher expected costs of financial distress 
and should use less debt. More volatile cash flows reduce the probability that tax 
shields will be fully utilised. 
The pecking order theory, however, predicts a positive relationship between firm 
leverage and risk. This ought to be premised on the notion that the volatility of cash 
flows implies the volatility of earnings. As such, the firm becomes constrained to 
finance out of retained earnings. It would therefore have to seek funding from the 
external markets, starting off with the debt market, to avoid the problem of adverse 
selection. In synch with this view, Frank and Goyal (2009, p. 9) assert that firms with 
volatile shares are expected to be those about which beliefs are quite volatile. It 
would seem plausible that such firms suffer more from adverse selection. If so, the 
pecking order theory would predict that riskier firms have higher leverage. Frank 
and Goyal (2009) further suggest that firms with volatile cash flows might need to 
periodically access the external capital markets. 
Ahmed et al. (2010, p. 10) found a positive relationship between capital structure 
and risk of insurance companies. They contend that the debt ratio increases with the 
increase of the claim ratio of Pakistan insurance companies, while Al-Najjar and 
Hussainey (2011, p. 335) report a negative relationship between firm leverage and 
risk. They studied a sample of UK firms and their results show that there is a negative 
relationship between firms’ risk and capital structure. They aver that firms with high 
risk will tend to have a higher risk of default and less access to debt financing. 
2.6. Dividend Policy 
The interaction of dividend policy and firm leverage can be explained in two ways. 
Firstly, signalling is one mechanism by which dividend policy filters into the capital 
structure decision. Increased dividends signal increased future earnings, and so the 
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firm’s cost of equity will be lower, favouring equity to debt. To the contrary, a 
dividend cut might signal financial distress and send out a negative sentiment to the 
equity market. Therefore, from the signalling theory perspective, firm leverage is 
anticipated to be inversely related to the dividend payout ratio. 
Secondly, from the premise of the contracting cost theory, one way to attenuate the 
free cash flow problem of overinvestment is to increase the dividend payout ratio. 
Similarly, to mitigate the problem of suboptimal investment, the firm can pursue a 
restrictive dividend policy and thereby reduce its dividend payout ratio. In the former 
case, the firm is constrained to access more debt and in the latter case the firm is 
liberated to seek more debt.  
Antoniou et al. (2008, p. 80) report an inverse relation between leverage and 
dividends in the USA. They assert that this supports the view that dividend payments 
signal a firm’s future performance, and therefore high dividend-paying firms benefit 
from a lower equity cost of capital. Lemma and Negash (2014, p. 81) also found an 
inverse relationship between firm leverage and dividend payout ratio based on a 
study of firms drawn from nine developing economies in Africa, namely Botswana, 
Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa and Tunisia. 
 
3. Research Methodology 
3.1. Sample Description and Data Sources  
The population for this study comprised South African banking institutions both 
listed and not listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. In the sampling frame all 
the banks that had complete data sets for the 10-year period running from 2006 to 
2015 were considered. The Bureau van Dijk Bankscope database was used to source 
the audited financial statements of the banks. The banking sample comprised of 16 
banks. 
3.2. Variable Definition 
The variables that were utilised in this study are described in this section. 
 Dependent variables 
In this study three dependent variables were employed to test the relationship 
between leverage and its determinants. The primary dependent variable employed 
for this study was book leverage. The book leverage measure (BLE) is a broad 
measure of leverage, which is defined as one minus the ratio of book value of equity 
to book value of assets. This follows from Gropp and Heider (2010). Suffice to 
highlight that many proxies have been employed to define the leverage variable. 
There are three strands of literature in this regard. In the first instance, authors rely 
on one measure of leverage. In the second strand, authors rely on two measures of 
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leverage, namely book leverage and market leverage. In the last strand of literature 
authors rely on the broadest measure of leverage and have three proxies for leverage, 
namely total debt ratio, short-term debt ratio and long-term debt ratio. 
The major contestation has been whether to employ book leverage or market 
leverage, or both. Notwithstanding that the conundrum remains unresolved, studies 
that have employed both measures demonstrate that the results are robust to either 
proxy adopted. Therefore, the inference is largely the same irrespective of whether 
book leverage or market leverage is employed.1 Moreover, the justification for using 
book value leverage is premised on other considerations. Firstly, capital regulation 
of banks is imposed on book values and not market values and hence this became 
the variable of interest for the purposes of this study. Secondly, as the sample of 
banks included banks that were not listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, there 
was scant availability of market value data.  
As banks have an additional source of financing, in the form of deposits, in this study 
leverage was decomposed to analyse the dynamics of deposit financing. The 
secondary measures of leverage employed in this study were deposit leverage 
(deposit liabilities) and non-deposit leverage (non-deposit liabilities). Deposit 
leverage (DEPOSIT) equals the ratio of total deposits to total assets. This is 
consistent with Gropp and Heider. (2010, p. 605) Non-deposit leverage (NON-DEP) 
is the difference between book leverage and deposit leverage. 
 Independent variables 
The independent variables consisted of the firm-level determinants of capital 
structure as well as dummy variables. The firm-level determinants of capital 
structure that were considered for this study were size, growth, profitability, asset 
tangibility and risk. The proxies to capture these variables employed in this study are 
defined in Table 1. The dummy variables that were employed in this study were to 
capture the effects of the 2007–2009 GFC as well as a dummy variable to capture 
one of the remaining firm-level determinants of capital structure: dividends. The first 
one was the dummy variable (DIVIDEND) for dividends. It was defined as 1 when 
a bank paid out a dividend and 0 when the bank did not declare a dividend. The 
second dummy variable (GFC) was to capture the effects of the financial crisis. It 
was defined as 1 for the years when the financial crisis occurred and 0 otherwise. 
  
                                                             
1 See for instance (Antoniou et al., 2008; Frank & Goyal, 2004; Gropp & Heider, 2010; Hovakimian et 
al., 2001; Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Titman & Wessels, 1988, among others). 
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Table 1. Proxies employed for the independent variables used in this study 
Variable  Definition 
Growth Annual growth rate of total assets 
Size Natural logarithm of total assets 
Profit Return on average assets (ROAA) 
Asset tangibility Ratio of fixed assets to total assets 
Risk Ratio of impaired loans to gross loans 
3.3. Empirical Model Specification and Estimation Techniques 
To examine the relationship between leverage and its determinants, a static panel 
data model was specified. A battery of diagnostics tests was conducted to ensure that 
the estimated model was well specified and robust. The econometric analysis was 
conducted by employing Stata version 14 software. 
To test the relationship between bank leverage and firm-level determinants of capital 
structure, a static panel data model was specified as follows: 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 = 𝒙𝑖,𝑡
′ 𝜷+ 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(1) 
Where: 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡  = leverage (BLE, DEP, NON-DEP) for bank i at time t 
𝒙𝑖,𝑡
′  = vectors of explanatory variables (size, profit, growth, asset tangibility, 
dividend, risk and GFC) for bank i at time t 
β = a vector of slope parameters 
𝛼𝑖= group-specific constant term that embodies all the observable effects 
εi,t = composite error term that also takes care of other explanatory variables that 
equally determine leverage but were not included in the model. 
Equation (1) was estimated using the fixed effects (FE) with Driscoll and Kray 
(1998) standard errors estimator, which controls for cross-sectional dependence and 
heteroscedasticity. The pooled regression model and the random effects (RE) model 
were also estimated for comparison. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
In this section, the descriptive statistics of all the variables are presented. The trends 
of the variables over time are described in turn. The descriptive statistics of the 
variables are presented in Table 2. These are the central measures of tendency (mean 
and median), standard deviation and minimum and maximum values for the sample 
of banking firms under consideration.  
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Table 2. Summary statistics of the variables 




Book leverage 0.8696 0.9160 0.1095 0.3800 1.1300 
Deposit leverage 0.7602 0.8225 0.1897 0.0240 0.7602 
Non-deposit 
leverage 
0.1186 0.0907 0.1470 0.0071 0.7826 
Growth 0.1592 0.1199 0.1962 -0.5775 1.1195 
Profit 0.0191 0.0134 0.0380 -0.1694 0.2036 
Asset tangibility 0.0102 0.0089 0.0083 0.0005 0.0400 
Risk 0.0528 0.0249 0.0870 -0.0528 0.6878 
Size 10.8500 8.7100 5.0200 6.1800 27.5700 
Dividend 0.6500 1 0.4785 0 1 
GFC 0.3000 0 0.4597 0 1 
South African banks on average experience a mean year-on-year growth of 15.9% 
of their total assets. They also realise profits with a mean return of assets (ROA) of 
1.9%. This is modest in comparison to non-financial firms. Ramjee and Gwatidzo 
(2012, p. 59) in comparison report a mean ROA of 17% for their sample of non-
financial firms. The mean asset tangibility level of banks is 1% of total assets. This 
implies that on average, 1% of banks’ total assets consist of fixed assets. The average 
size of the bank approximated by the natural logarithm of total assets is 10.85. On 
average on any given year, 65% of the banks pay dividends. 
South African banks are highly levered in line with global norms. The mean book 
leverage of the banks is close to 86.9% of total assets. This is close to the levels 
reported by Gropp and Heider (2010, p. 593) in the case of large US and EU banks 
of 92.6% of assets. Comparatively, the median book leverage is 91.6%, which is 
close to the levels reported by Gropp and Heider (2010, p. 593), who reported a 
median book leverage of 92.7% for the same sample of banks.  
South African banks are highly levered in comparison to non-financial firms. Ramjee 
and Gwatidzo (2012, p. 59) report for a sample of South African non-financial firms 
a mean book leverage of 59% of total assets. On further analysis, South African 
banks’ leveraging exhibits a sustained upward trajectory in the aftermath of the 
2007–2009 GFC. 
4.2. Bank Leverage and Firm-Level Determinants of Capital Structure 
Having established the trends in key variables, this section reports on the analysis of 
the correlations among the key variables, after which the model was estimated. 
Robustness checks were performed to test whether the relationship between leverage 
and firm-level determinants is sensitive to the alternative definitions of leverage.  
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4.2.1. Correlation Analysis  
The correlations of the book leverage variable and the firm-level determinants are 
reported in Table 3. Suffice to highlight that the correlations are in line with the 
predictions of the major capital structure theories. Book leverage is negatively 
correlated with the growth variable and the correlation is statistically significant at 
the 5% level of significance. This is consistent with the predictions of the trade-off 
theory. Book leverage is also inversely correlated with profit and the correlation is 
highly significant. This can be explained premised on the predictions of the pecking 
order theory. The more profitable a bank is, the more likely that it will generate 
reserves than rely on debt to fund its assets. The negative correlation between book 
leverage is in line with the predictions of the trade-off theory.  
Size is positively correlated with book leverage. This can also be justified in terms 
of the trade-off theory of capital structure. Large banks are highly levered compared 
to small banks, the motivation being that they will derive a higher debt interest tax 
shield. 
Table 3. Correlation matrix 
 
(*) / (**) and (***) indicate the (10%), (5%) and (1%) level of significance respectively. The 
variables are defined as follows:  
book leverage = 1-(equity/total assets); deposit leverage = total deposits/total assets; non-
deposit leverage = book leverage – deposit leverage; growth = growth rate of total assets; 
profit = ROAA; asset tangibility = fixed assets/total assets; risk = impaired loans/gross loans; 
size = natural logarithm of total assets; dividend = dummy variable = (1 when dividend is 
paid and 0 when dividend is not paid). 
Book leverage is positively related to deposit leverage. In fact, deposit leverage 
explains 63.8% variation in book leverage. Non-deposit leverage is negatively 
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correlated with deposit leverage and has about 84% explanatory power. The 
correlation is highly significant at the 1% level of significance. This corroborates the 
findings that over time, deposit liabilities have been substituting debt and equity in 
bank financing. Deposit leverage is negatively associated to growth. The inference 
is that banks with growth prospects are relying more on long-term debt or other 
sources of non-deposit finance, rather than deposits to pursue these opportunities.  
Conversely, non-deposit leverage is positively related to growth and the correlation 
is statistically highly significant. Deposit leverage is inversely correlated with profit. 
This is explainable in terms of the pecking order theory. Profitable banks are likely 
to observe the financing hierarchy and finance out of retaining earnings before 
relying on deposits. Conversely, non-deposit leverage is positively correlated with 
profit. Deposit leverage is negatively correlated with asset tangibility. The rationale 
could be that small banks that have less asset tangibility rely more on debt financing 
rather than deposits as compared to the big banks. Further, deposit leverage is 
negatively related to risk. To the contrary, non-deposit leverage is positively 
correlated with risk. Therefore, with increased credit risk banks will fund their assets 
using non-deposit liabilities. 
Non-deposit leverage is positively related to size. Large banks are likely to employ 
debt in their financing predicated upon the trade-off theory. On examining the 
correlation matrix, certain trends emerged. The first pattern that emerged was that 
the correlations involving deposit leverage moved and were of the same sign as those 
involving the book leverage variable. This demonstrates that deposit leverage and 
book leverage are highly correlated. Secondly, the correlations involving non-
deposit leverage were of opposite sign to the ones involving the deposit leverage 
variable. Wherever the correlations are significant, they are of opposite sign. This 
further demonstrates the substitutability of non-deposit liabilities by deposit 
liabilities. 
4.2.2. Panel Regression Results 
The regression outputs for testing the relationship between bank leverage and firm-
level determinants of capital structure are presented in Table 4. The pooled OLS and 
RE estimation results are reported simply for comparison. Suffice to highlight that 
the estimated coefficients and signs of the RE and FE estimation outputs are 
comparable for most of the variables. However, the analysis was based on the FE 
with Driscoll and Kray (1998) estimation results, which controlled for 
heteroscedasticity and cross-sectional dependence. 
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Table 4. Panel regression results with book leverage as the dependent variable 
 Pooled ordinary least 
squares (OLS) 
Random Effects FE with Driscoll and Kray 
(1998) standard errors 
Growth 0.061  0.074*** 0.076** 
(1.28) (2.62 ) (3.19) 
Profit -1.851*** -0.993*** -0.824*** 
(-5.64) (-11.67)  (-25.84) 
Asset tangibility -2.935** -1.147   -0.205 
(-3.19) (-0.82)  (-0.33) 
Risk -0.161** 0.212** 0.297*** 
(-1.56) (2.29 )  (4.57) 
Size 0.003** 0.007 0.023*** 
(3.28) (1.52 )  (3.26) 
Dividend 
 
0.048*** -0.007 -0.008 
(3.62) ( -0.77) (-1.10) 
GFC 0.030*** 0.003  -0. 016*** 
(2.34) (0.2)  (-2.74) 
Constant 0.863*** 0.808***   0.609*** 
(51.46) (12.53) (6.84) 
Adjusted R2 0.5750 0.6343 0.6490 
F-statistic   249.03*** 
LM-statistic  75910***  
(*)/(**) and (***) indicate the (10%), (5%) and (1%) level of significance respectively.  
Time dummies estimated for the FE and RE models are not reported here. The t-statistics 
for the pooled and FE models as well as the z-statistics for the RE model are reported in 
parentheses.  
 Leverage and profitability 
The estimation results confirm an inverse relationship between banks’ book leverage 
and profitability. All three models predict a negative relationship between bank 
leverage and profitability (refer to Table 4). The FE model predicts that a 1% 
increase in a bank’s profits will result in an 82.4% decrease in a bank’s book 
leverage. This result is highly significant at the 1% level of significance. Therefore, 
it could be said that bank financing mirrors that of non-financial firms, as explained 
by the pecking order theory. Among other scholars, Ahmad and Abbas (2011, p. 
211), Gropp and Heider (2010, p. 598) and Jucá, De Sousa and Fishlow (2012, p. 
23) also found an inverse relationship between firm leverage and profitability for 
their sample of financial firms. 
 Leverage and asset tangibility 
Firms with more tangible assets are presumed to offer more collateral and hence are 
viewed favourable in the debt market. Therefore, the trade-off theory predicts a 
positive relationship between leverage and asset tangibility. On the other hand, the 
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pecking order theory predicts a negative relationship between firm leverage and asset 
tangibility. The results of this study were inconclusive in this regard.  
The pooled OLS regression predicts a negative and statistically significant 
relationship between book leverage and asset tangibility. Similarly, the RE estimator 
predicts a negative though statistically insignificant association between book 
leverage and asset tangibility. To the contrary, although statistically insignificant, 
the FE estimator predicts a negative relationship between the book leverage and the 
asset tangibility variables. Therefore, the results point to support of the pecking order 
theory, although not significant in all models despite the same sign.  
 Leverage and growth prospects 
The financing patterns of South African banking firms seem to be conforming to the 
pecking order theory’s prediction. The prediction is that firms faced with growth 
prospects will observe a financial hierarchy in financing their operations. The 
presupposition is that given the option between debt and finance, firms will choose 
debt first. Therefore, a direct relationship exists between book leverage and growth 
prospects. All three models predict a positive relationship between book leverage 
and growth. The FE and RE predictions are statistically significant at the 5% and 1% 
levels of significance, respectively. The FE model predicts that a 1% increase in 
growth prospects will result in a 7.6% increase in leverage. The positive prediction 
is consistent with the findings of Ahmed et al. (2010, p. 10) and Al-Najjar and 
Hussainey (2011, p. 333), among other scholars who considered non-financial firms, 
as well as that of Ahmad and Abbas (2011, p. 211) and Teixeira, Silva, Fernandes 
and Alves (2014, p. 56), who studied financial firms. 
 Leverage and dividend payer 
An inverse relationship was expected to subsist between book leverage and dividend 
payout. This was premised on the signalling theory. Based on this theory, the 
payment of a dividend sends out a signal to the market that the prospects of the 
company are good and that it is a going concern. This will make equity the favourable 
option. To the contrary, the pooled OLS estimator predicts a positive relationship, 
which is statistically significant. However, the RE and FE estimators predict an 
inverse relationship, although it is statistically insignificant at the 10% level of 
significance. Based on the FE estimators, which are the most appropriate, there is an 
inverse association between book leverage and dividends, although not significant. 
 Leverage and size 
A positive association exists between bank book leverage and size. This prediction 
is consistent among all three estimators, although the RE estimator reports a 
statistically insignificant result. The FE estimator predicts that a 1% increase in size 
will result in a 2.3% increase in book leverage. This positive association between 
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bank book leverage and size is consistent with both the pecking order and the trade-
off theory prediction that large firms should be highly levered as compared to small 
firms. They stand to benefit from a debt interest tax shield. As firms grow, they also 
observe the financing hierarchy and would favour debt as opposed to equity. This 
result corroborates the findings of Gropp and Heider (2010, p. 598). 
 Leverage and credit risk 
This hypothesis was predicated on the notion that there is a positive relationship 
between bank leverage and credit risk. The pecking order theory predicts a positive 
relationship between leverage and risk. With increased credit risk there is bound to 
be increased cash flow volatility. Cash flow volatility implies the volatility of 
retained earnings. Banks are therefore forced to finance out of debt before utilising 
equity. The FE and RE estimators confirm a direct relationship between bank 
leverage and credit risk. The FE model predicts that a 1% increase in leverage will 
result in a 29.7% increase in book leverage. The relationship is statistically 
significant at the 1% level of significance. 
 Leverage and GFC 
This hypothesis was based on the notion that there is an inverse relationship between 
leverage and the dummy variable representing the 2007–2009 GFC. This period was 
characterised by banks deleveraging and also strengthening their capital levels 
through the use of either retained earnings or equity issues. During this period, 
financing out of debt instruments became a less favourable option as compared to 
financing out of retained earnings and equity. Empirical support for this claim was 
found in the study results. According to the FE estimator results, it can be asserted 
with 99% confidence that book leverage is inversely related to the GFC.  
4.2.3. Robustness Tests of the Bank Leverage Variable 
The robustness checks on the dependent variable are documented in Table 5. 
Table 5. Robustness checks of the bank leverage variable 
Dependent variable Book leverage Non-deposit leverage Deposit leverage 
Growth 0.076** 0.060** 0.026 
Profit -0.824*** 0.970** -1.601** 
Asset -0.205 -0.786 0.888 
Risk 0.297*** -0.555*** 0.946*** 
Size 0.023** 0.003 0.019 
Dividend -0.008 -0.001 -0.012 
(*) / (**) and (***) indicate the (10%), (5%) and (1%) level of significance respectively. 
Suffice to highlight that the results are robust to the alternative definitions of the 
dependent variable. The results presented in Table 5 also demonstrate the effective 
substitution between deposit leverage and non-deposit leverage of banks. Whenever 
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the predicted coefficient between non-deposit leverage and the explanatory variable 
is statistically significant, it is oppositely signed to the predicted coefficient between 
deposit leverage and that explanatory variable. For instance, the coefficient of non-
deposit leverage is positive when profit is the regressor as compared to the negative 
coefficient of deposit leverage when profit is the regressor. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This article reported on an examination of the determinants of bank capital structure 
and documents the empirical results of testing the hypotheses relating to the 
financing behaviour of South African banks. A static model was specified to estimate 
the relationship between bank leverage and firm-level determinants. The standard 
firm-level determinants of capital structure were found to offer significant 
explanatory power of the leverage variable. On the one hand, the growth 
opportunities, risk and size variables were found to be positively related to the 
leverage variable. On the other hand, a negative relationship was found to exist 
between profits and bank leverage. The results of the study also demonstrated that 
the financing behaviour of South African banks could be best explained in terms of 
the pecking order theory. The results also confirmed bank deleveraging during the 
2007–2009 GFC, as a negative relationship subsisted between leverage and the 
dummy variable representing the GFC. As such, the financing behaviour of South 
African banks could be said to mirror that of non-financial firms in many respects. 
The results of this study lend credence to the “standard corporate view” and relegate 
capital regulation to be of secondary importance in the determination of bank capital 
structure. As such it is imperative for South African monetary authorities to revise 
their capital regulations in order to make them effective. 
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